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Charter Tracks: Twenty-Five Years
of Constitutional Influence on the
Criminal Trial Process and
Rules of Evidence
David Paciocco

I. INTRODUCTION
Charter1 tracks are all over the trial process, including the law of
evidence. They are most evident in the “new rules” the Charter inspired.
The most notorious new rule is, of course, section 24(2), the exclusionary
remedy. While it has featured large in many major crime prosecutions2 its
primary impact has been in the impaired driving area where it has upended
thousands of cases that once would have been routine convictions. An
equally momentous “new rule” is the Stinchcombe3 disclosure obligation,
coupled with the various related disclosure obligations it has engendered.4
Extensive disclosure to the defence has changed the way criminal law is
practised. While sharing the fruits of the investigation and producing
other relevant third party information has no doubt enhanced the ability
to protect the innocent, it has done so at the cost of lengthening trials by


Professor of Law, University of Ottawa.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
Its most dramatic applications were in R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R.
607 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (S.C.C.).
3
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
4
These include the O’Connor regime for securing third party records that are subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in non-sexual offence cases (R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98,
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.)); the Mills regime for obtaining third party records that are subject to
a reasonable expectation of privacy in sexual offence cases (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
as interpreted in R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.)), and the McNeil
regime for securing third party records having no reasonable expectation of privacy (R. v. McNeil,
[2006] O.J. No. 4746 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 57 (S.C.C.)).
While the first third two-party records regimes are well understood, I describe the R. v. McNeil
regime in detail in D. Paciocco, “Filling the Seam between Stinchcombe and O’Connor: The “McNeil”
Disclosure Application” (2007) 53 Crim. L.Q. 161.
1
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requiring disclosure and production voir dires, furnishing the fodder for
exhaustive cross-examination, and by revealing issues and concerns that
otherwise would have gone unexplored. Then there are the new self incrimination rules. The only two evidence rules expressed in the Charter’s
legal rights provisions — section 11(c)’s non-compellability for accused
persons and section 13’s quid pro quo protection for prior witness
testimony — appeared to largely mirror existing self-incrimination law.5
Section 7 has been used, however, to extend the concept of selfincrimination beyond mere statements to include both “products of the
mind and products of the body”. 6 Section 7 has also grounded new
Charter-based rights including constitutional exemptions from being
subpoenaed,7 the protection of accused persons from evidence derived
from their prior testimony,8 the prima facie exclusion of other evidence
discovered as a result of involuntary confessions,9 protection for detainees
from elicited undercover conversations,10 a constitutional right to silence
that some believe supplements the common law voluntariness rule11 and
constitutional standards for testing the validity of statutorily compelled
conscriptive evidence.12 Section 7 has also “constitutionalized” the common
law voluntariness rule.13 Moreover, the Charter has ushered in novel but
5
These rules do largely mirror existing protection, but they have altered it in important
ways. Most notably, s. 11(c) has, for all intents and purposes, removed the adverse inference from
failing to testify (R. v. Noble, [1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.)), while s. 13 has
made witness protection automatic and extended the protection to information that was not known
to be self-incriminating at the time it was revealed (R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, 48 C.R. (3d)
193 (S.C.C.)).
6
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, at para. 34 (S.C.C.).
7
Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, (sub nom. R. v.
Bagri) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 72 (S.C.C.). This right exists but its terms are so restrictive it is
almost impossible to access.
8
R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, 36 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.), explained in British Columbia
(Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, 38 C.R. (4th) 133 (S.C.C.).
9
R. v. Sweeney, [2000] O.J. No. 3534, 50 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.).
10
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.).
11
A constitutional right to silence that can be breached by state agents overbearing the
desire of individuals to refrain from speaking to authorities has been recognized. In my opinion, the
test for a breach is functionally redundant to the voluntariness rule. See David M. Paciocco & Lee
Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at 305-307.
12
R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.), and see R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003]
S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.), using those standards to determine the constitutional
validity of DNA warrant legislation.
13
R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 (S.C.C.). This constitutional
right is impractical because it perfectly tracks the common law voluntariness rule. To access the
constitutional right the burden of proof is on the accused to prove involuntariness on the balance of
probability, whereas the common law rule provides a preferable way to vindicate self-incrimination
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tightly controlled standing for complainants and witnesses under limited
circumstances.14
As important, evident and deep as these tracks are, I will not discuss
them here. They have all been closely followed. Instead, my interest is
in those Charter tracks that circle statutory and common law rules. The
received view is that there are few. During the last Cameron colloquium
on criminal law in 1995, the Hon. Marc Rosenberg observed that “[o]verall
. . . the Charter has not led to a profound re-examination of the basic
evidentiary framework.”15 Without question, it was true then that few
rules of evidence or criminal procedures had been struck down and
declared to be of no force or effect, and this in fact remains so today. On
the surface, it clearly does appear that what marks the savanna of trial
process are not Charter tracks so much as the bleached bones of failed
Charter challenges. To draw that conclusion, however, would be to
overlook the fact that the broadest impact that the Charter has had on
criminal trials is more furtive, and in fact, decidedly more profound than
struck statutes; the Charter has altered the way criminal procedure rules
operate. In subterranean fashion, the Charter has changed the very culture
of proof and process by not only colouring our general conceptions of
what is fair, but by changing relevant legal technique. The Charter has
contributed to the rejection of the long-standing practice of treating the
law of evidence and criminal procedure as a technical thing, replacing it
with a contextual, discretionary approach that, properly applied, can be
highly sensitive to the due process interests of the accused.16 Given that
most of the rules look much the same as they did prior to the Charter it
is fair to say that the Charter has not overhauled criminal procedure. Those
rules, however, do not now work the same way. Those Charter tracks
may be subtle but they are everywhere, and the effect of the Charter’s
visit to the trial process has been profound. The place to begin, however,

concerns because it imposes its burden on the Crown to prove voluntariness, and uses an even
stricter standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
14
A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 102, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.).
15
The Hon. Marc Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in
Criminal Cases,” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 193.
16
Justice Rosenberg noted each of these developments in his article. He observed how
“it has begun to . . . subtly change the understanding of trial fairness” and how, by provoking
“discretion in applying exclusionary rules . . .”, the Charter has “equipped [courts] with the tools to
relieve the most blatant unfairness”: the Hon. Marc Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the
Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases,” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal
Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 198, 191.
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is with the caution and veneer of hostility which greeted the Charter’s
arrival and the case for Charter oversight.

II. CAUTION AND CHARTER OVERSIGHT
The Supreme Court of Canada, while mindful of the importance of
individual rights in criminal cases, has always sought to place a governor
on the speed the Charter travels. Comments clearly calculated to keep
claimed Charter rights from destabilizing criminal procedure in general,
and the trial process in particular, are common. To emphasize that the
Charter has not given criminal procedure a monochromatic focus that
reflects only shades of liberty, the Court has stressed that principles of
fundamental justice “embrace interests and perspectives beyond those
of the accused”.17 The Court has reminded us on a number of occasions
that “the fairness of the trial process must be made ‘from the point of
view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant’ and
not just the accused”,18 and that fundamental justice and section 11(d)
entitle the accused to a “fair hearing” and not to “the most favourable
procedures that could possibly be imagined”.19
At times, jurists have gone beyond simply stressing the need for
balance and have openly resisted the suggestion that constitutional
oversight of the criminal process is required. In the early days, there were
judges who revealed their belief that pre-Charter trials were fair enough.
Some even considered the suggestion that the Charter could be used as
an instrument for modifying criminal procedure to be a slur against the
past; it would somehow “constitute a declaration that all criminal trials
[had] heretofore been unfair”20 or that the law had “for many years . . .
subjected accused persons to fundamental injustice”.21 It was therefore
proclaimed boldly that “to import into the concept of procedural fair
trial a means to control evidentiary law was not possible”. 22 In R. v.
17
R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at paras. 72, 73 (S.C.C.); Cunningham
v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, at para. 17 (S.C.C.).
18
R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R 668, at para. 72 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. E.
(A.W), [1993] S.C.J. No. 90, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 155, at 198 (S.C.C.).
19
R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at para. 88 (S.C.C.), and R. v.
Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 36 C.R. (5th) 223 (S.C.C.).
20
R. v. Piraino, [1982] O.J. No. 3352, 37 O.R. (2d) 574, at 576 (Ont. H.C.J.).
21
R. v. Balderstone, [1982] M.J. No. 403, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 37, at 46 (Man. Q.B.), affd [1983]
M.J. No. 207, [1983] 6 W.W.R. 438 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1983] 2 S.C.R. v, 27 Man. R.
(2d) 240 (S.C.C.).
22
R. v. Shutiak (1983), 10 W.C.B. 480 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).
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L. (D.O.),23 L’Heureux-Dubé J. cautioned that “[o]ne must recognize that
the rules of evidence have not been constitutionalized into unalterable
principles of fundamental justice,”24 and in Germany v. Ebke,25 Vertes J.
commented that he was “not aware of any evidentiary rule that can be
said to be a fundamental principle of justice”.26
Unwelcoming comments have even been made, on occasion, by
some of Canada’s greatest criminal law judges. In R. v. Williams,27 Martin
J.A. spoke not of how the constitutional right to make full answer and
defence would impact on the rules of proof, but instead of how “an accused
in exercising his right to make full answer and defence must comply
with the established rules of procedure and the rules respecting the
admissibility of evidence.”28 Even Sopinka J., one of the Charter’s great
champions, was so emphatic in insisting that “[t]he right to full answer
and defence does not imply that an accused can have, under the rubric of
the Charter, an overhaul of the whole law of evidence” that he said it in
identical words in two different judgments five years apart.29
For my part, I have always found such statements to be discouraging.
If there is a legitimate place for making the judiciary the “guardians of
the constitution” and for using constitutional principles to test whether
the balance found in legislation or common law rules is right, it is in
matters of criminal procedure including its rules of proof. As American
scholar, Alexander M. Bickel remarked close to 40 years ago in the
American context:
[T]here was no question that basic matters of criminal procedure were
ultimately the province of judges.

23

[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285, at 309 (S.C.C.).
25
[2001] N.W.T.J. No. 13 (N.W.T.S.C.).
26
Germany v. Ebke, [2001] N.W.T.J. No. 13, at para. 55 (N.W.T.S.C.). He allowed the
possible exception of the voluntariness rule. The point is generally right but I think overstated. To
take but one example, the right to cross-examine is also a principle of fundamental justice.
27
[1985] O.J. No. 2489, 50 O.R. (2d) 321 (Ont. C.A.).
28
R. v. Williams, [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 50 O.R. (2d) 321, at 337 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. xiv, 50 O.R. (2d) 321n (S.C.C.).
29
Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 113, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505, at 1515
(S.C.C.); R. v. Crawford, [1995] S.C.J. No. 30, 37 C.R. (4th) 197, at 214 (S.C.C.). As Don Stuart
points out, his words, even though spoken twice, seem totally at odds with his later positions:
Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2001), at 190.
24
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It took no violent stretching of democratic theory to suppose . . .
that the political branches would abide by the judge’s sense of what was
mete and decent in the way of procedure.30

Since it is judges who are expert in assessing the impact of process
on justice, they are best suited to find the balance between criminal law
enforcement ambitions, and due process.31 It is no coincidence that when
section 7 of the Charter was being debated, the worry was not that it would
be used to support procedural “due process”; that much was expected.
The concern was that the Charter might be interpreted to empower courts
to override substantive rules of criminal law.32 In truth, contrasting the
sometimes reticent embrace of procedural review in criminal cases with
the robust declaration that the principles of fundamental justice give courts
the responsibility to vet substantive rules of criminal law33 seems positively
curious.
Not only does criminal procedure fall within the natural zone of
competence of judicial oversight, procedure has long been recognized as
the cornerstone of justice. As American Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter
observed in McNabb v. U.S.,34 “the history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards.”35 If process falls short,
justice will. And when justice falls short in a liberty-regarding society it
is often either because of a failure to translate the culture of liberty from
the traditions of Western legal thought into the ethos of some judges and
lawyers, or because of the poor design of rules. My early and continued
enthusiasm for identifying and using Charter principles in matters of
criminal procedure 36 arose, not only because those principles reify the
30
A.M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (New York: Harper & Row,
1970), at 32.
31
To the contrary, see David Doherty (now the Hon. Justice David Doherty of the Ontario
Court of Appeal) “The Charter and Reforming the Law of Evidence” (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 314.
32
See the comments of the Assistant Deputy Minister of Department of Justice to the
special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, January 27, 1981, at 43:32, The Deputy Minister and the
then federal Minister of Justice, The Hon. Jean Chrétien, all recorded in Reference re Section 94(2)
of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 504-505 (S.C.C.),
where the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the apparent intent of the framers to confine s. 7 to
matters of procedural review.
33
See Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
34
McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
35
McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, at 347 (1942), cited in Reference re Section 94(2) of the
Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 513 (S.C.C.).
36
See “The Constitutional Right to Present Defence Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1985)
63 Can. Bar Rev. 519; Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987);
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priority that history has shown us should be given to fundamental
individual rights in criminal cases, but also because Charter principles
provide a clear opportunity to salvage from the tyranny of inadequate
rules, the base underlying notion that makes Canadian criminal law such
a noble thing in spite of the damage it can do to those who are convicted
— the “principle . . . that the innocent must not be convicted”.37
It is not that established procedural rules had been designed with the
goal of obstructing this principle. Quite the opposite has been true. Most
pre-Charter rules of procedure were liberty regarding. It is just that rules
are, by their nature, “general” in the sense that they are to be applied
where their conditions are met; the “rule of law” demands no less. Yet
criminal trial procedure does not work well when it is rigid. This is
mainly because criminal trial process is less about outcomes than it is
about facts, and facts vary, and circumstances are dynamic. It is also
because the criminal trial process is largely about “due process” or, as
Bickel described it, “elemental justice to the individual”;38 generalized
and strictly limited rules of the kind expected in substantive law do not
work well in matters of process because they can overreach, or underperform, losing their liberty-regarding function. Even with the best of
intentions, the shortcomings of language and foresight invariably mean
that general rules will catch cases that do not advance their underlying
purposes, and miss cases that would. Charter oversight provides an
important opportunity to correct this when it happens. This has largely
occurred, but not in the way that one might have expected, and admittedly,
not using the mode I had imagined.

“The Charter and the Rape Shield Provisions of The Criminal Code: More About Relevance and the
Constitutional Exemptions Doctrine” (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 119.
37
R. v. Liepert, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 24 (S.C.C.). For a fuller
description of this principle and its impact on criminal procedure see D. Paciocco, “Balancing the
Rights of the Individual and Society in Matters of Truth and Proof: Part II – Evidence about
Innocence” (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 39. In “Evidence About Guilt: Balancing the Rights of the
Individual and Society in Matters of Truth and Proof” (2001), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 433, I make the case
for securing the criminal law enforcement goal of permitting the truth about guilt to be established
through the principle of access to evidence.
38
A.M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (New York: Harper & Row,
1970), at 32.
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III. UNUSED 52: PROTECTING EXISTING RULES
When the Charter was initially proclaimed in force, it was natural to
assume that it would be section 52 of the Constitution Act, 198239 that
would temper the rules of criminal procedure. That was certainly my
assumption.40 In R. v. Albright,41 Lamer J. also anticipated this kind of
impact when he said:
The conduct of a trial in general, including the application of the rules
of evidence in a given case, must not result in the trial being unfair . . .
If a rule of law, statutory or common law, were framed in such a way
that it would be per se a violation of the right to a fair trial, then the
statute would be declared inoperative or the common law declared to be
otherwise.42

For the most part, though, section 52 has had little work to do in this
field; few rules of evidence or criminal procedure have been struck down
or changed overtly because of recognized Charter breaches. Indeed, where
existing rules have been struck down, they have, at times, been replaced
by other rules or have engendered practices that in some respects provide
less protection to accused persons.
The most obvious target for Charter challenge was the mandatory
presumptions and reverse onus provisions that salted Canadian law. These
rules, in turn, either put the onus on the accused to raise a reasonable
doubt about a material fact (mandatory presumptions) or required the
accused to actually prove a material fact (reverse onus provisions). Initially,
the Charter looked as though it would sweep them all away. The guarantee
of a constitutional presumption of innocence in section 11(d) raised that
possibility and then R. v. Oakes43 created the expectation. In Oakes, the
Court struck down the presumption in section 8 of the Narcotics Control
Act44 that those who possessed narcotics did so for the purpose of
trafficking. That section effectively called on the accused to disprove the
intent to traffic in order to avoid conviction, even though not all those
who were caught by its terms had possessed enough narcotic, or possessed
it in circumstances, where intent to traffic could fairly be inferred. The
39

Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 15-16.
41
[1987] S.C.J. No. 56, 60 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Albright, [1987] S.C.J. No. 56, at para. 25, 60 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
43
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
44
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, now repealed and replaced by the Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, on May 14, 1997, SI/97-47.
40

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER TRACKS

317

provision therefore suffered from the frailty I describe above. It was
over-inclusive. Given the burden it placed on the accused, the rule
contemplated the conviction of those accused persons who could not
fully persuade judges or juries that they had no intent to traffic but who
could nonetheless raise a reasonable doubt about the reason for their
possession. Since proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the minimum
standard of conviction that is tolerated in a system intent on ensuring
that the innocent not be convicted,45 a conviction for trafficking in such a
case would prima facie violate the Charter. In Oakes, the government could
not justify section 8 using section 1 of the Charter, and so section 8 fell.
One could have been forgiven for assuming in the aftermath of
Oakes46 that it would be an imposing if not insurmountable burden for the
state to justify provisions that tolerate conviction in the face of reasonable
doubt. Yet this has not proved to be true. While some sections that have
fallen,47 there has been a “very clear trend” to upholding them. 48 Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Canada has on several occasions on its own
adopted the stratagem of reversing the onus of proof to protect public
law enforcement interests.49 Section 11(d) has not had the cleansing
effect on presumptions that one may have initially thought. Indeed, this
is an area where Charter law has backfired. Since presumptions and reverse
onus provisions have been given effective constitutional approval, they

45
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is protected constitutionally by the
presumption of innocence: R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
46
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
47
See, for example, R. v. Laba, [1994] S.C.J. No. 106, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965 (S.C.C.),
striking down s. 394(1)(b) that possessed previous metal is unlawfully possessed. The section was
not struck down because it imposed a burden on the accused, but instead because imposing a less
onerous burden would have sufficed to protect the state interest. In R. v. Curtis, [1998] O.J. No. 467,
14 C.R. (5th) 328 (Ont. C.A.), s. 215(2), the burden of proof imposed on the accused relating to a
lawful excuse for failing to provide the necessities of life was read down to include a lesser burden.
R. v. Boyle, [1983] O.J. No. 3031, 35 C.R. (3d) 34 (Ont. C.A.), is one of the few cases to strike
down a presumption in its entirety. The case found unconstitutional a presumption in s. 312(2) of
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 (now s. 354(2)), that a person possessing a vehicle with a defaced serial
number knows that it was obtained by an indictable offence.
48
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough: ON: Carswell,
2001), at 348.
49
R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.), reversing the onus on
the defence of extreme intoxication; R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.J. No. 27, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.),
reversing the onus on automatism defences; R. v. Audet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 61, 48 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.),
presuming a position of authority for teachers relative to students where consent is pleaded in
defence of sexual interference charges.
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have proliferated.50 As Don Stuart has remarked, Canadian law is
“conspicuous for its overuse of reverse onus causes”.51
Without question, the most dramatic occasion on which section 52
was used to strike down a rule of trial procedure was in R. v. Seaboyer,52
where again the problem was over-inclusiveness. Seaboyer involved a
challenge to section 276 of the Criminal Code,53 the so-called “rape
shield” provision. That provision prevented accused persons from crossexamining sexual assault complainants about, or presenting evidence of,
their past sexual experience unless the case fell into one of three tightly
defined exceptions. While these exceptions inherently recognized that
there would be some situations where evidence revealing the past sexual
experience of sexual assault complainants would be helpful in raising a
doubt about the guilt of the accused, the section was too restrictive.
Parliament had not succeeded in identifying all cases where such evidence
50
In 1997, Parliament reversed the onus on bail release for all drug traffickers (Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515(6)(d)) and those charged with criminal organization offences
(Criminal Code, s. 515(6)(a)(ii)). In 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Act did the same for terrorism
offences (Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 19(4), see Criminal Code, s. 515(6)(a)(iii)) and
for designated offences under the Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (Anti-Terrorism Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 19(4), see Criminal Code, s. 515(6)(a)(iv) and (v)). Parliament also created a
public interest defence for the release of protected information by persons permanently bound to
secrecy under the Security of Information Act but made it a reverse onus defence (Anti-Terrorism Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 29). That same statute placed an onus on the accused in criminal prosecutions
for offences against protected persons. The accused must cast doubt on the truth of an assertion
contained in a certificate issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the crime victim was entitled under
international law to protection from attack “against his or her person, freedom or dignity” (AntiTerrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 3(4), see Criminal Code, s. 7(10)). As a result of the cultural
shift, reversing the onus to the accused is currently a favoured strategy for law and order reform
proposals. Bill C-27 will reverse the onus for bail release for those charged with firearm offences
(Bill C-27, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (dangerous offenders and recognizance to keep the
peace, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006)). Bill C-35 proposes to reverse the onus in dangerous offender
proceedings for repeat offenders (Bill C-35, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (reverse onus in
bail hearings for firearm-related offences, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006). And Bill C-25 reverses the
onus in money-laundering cases (Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering)
and Terrorist Financing Act and the Income Tax Act and to make consequential amendment to
another Act, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006 (S.C. 2006, c. 12, assented to December 14, 2006)). Without
question, the penchant to get tough in this way has been influenced by the perceived approval found
in constitutional jurisprudence. During Parliamentary debates, the Hon. Peter Milliken defended the
government’s initiative to reverse the onus in dangerous offending proceedings by chiding an
opposition member that “[h]e is fully aware that reverse onus provisions in the code already have
been challenged and upheld as constitutionally strong” (the Hon. Peter Milliken, House of Commons
Debates, Official Report (Hansard) Thursday, November 29, 2006, at 1629, referencing Bill C-27
during the second reading debate).
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Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 401.
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[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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would be needed to present full answer and defence, and so it was contrary
to the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7. This
provision overshot the mark by excluding probative evidence that would
not be sufficiently prejudicial to justify excluding, and so it had to fall.
In some respects even the Seaboyer54 challenge backfired. It was in
Seaboyer that the Supreme Court of Canada recognized, for the first
time, a judicial discretion to exclude defence evidence,55 although it limited
that power to cases where the probative value of the proof is substantially
outweighed by the prejudice it causes.56 Moreover, the Court signalled
that rape-shield protections should apply even in cases involving prior
sexual relations between the accused and the complainant, which had
been unregulated by section 276.57 As a result of Seaboyer, Parliament
passed a replacement provision which incorporated that protection. While
the Seaboyer challenge did reclaim some ground for those accused, it did
so at the price of giving other important ground away.
To be sure, there have been other cases where modest section 52
victories have occurred. In R. v. Bain,58 for example, the Supreme Court
of Canada struck down a provision that permitted the Crown to exercise
unlimited “stand asides” during jury selection. And in R. v. Branco,59
a constitutional limit was read into section 650(2) of the Criminal Code60
restricting the use of commission evidence against the accused at his trial
to cases where the accused was both present and afforded an opportunity
to cross-examine when that evidence was taken.
Beyond this modest array of cases, attempts to use the Charter to
strike down legislated rules of evidence have largely foundered. In R. v.
Lyons,61 special procedures in place relating to the identification of
dangerous offenders survived. In R. v. Corbett,62 a constitutional challenge
to section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act,63 which permits the accused
to be confronted when testifying with his or her prior criminal convictions,
54

R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
Previously the law had denied judges a discretion to exclude defence evidence based on
its prejudice: R. v. Valley, [1986] O.J. No. 77, 26 C.C.C.(3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Hawke, [1975]
O.J. No. 2200, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 19, at 54-55 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117, at 139 (S.C.C.).
57
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117, at 158 (S.C.C.).
58
[1992] S.C.J. No. 3, 10 C.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.).
59
[1988] O.J. No. 120, 62 C.R. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.).
60
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.).
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[1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10.
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failed to render the provision of no force or effect. In R. v. Potvin,64 a
constitutional challenge to section 715, which permits hearsay evidence
from the preliminary inquiry to be admitted at trial in cases of necessity
where the accused was given an opportunity to cross-examine, came up
short. In deciding the case the Court refused to accept that fundamental
justice includes a right to confront witnesses at trial.65 In R. v. L. (D.O.),66
section 715.1, which permits videotaped statements that have been
adopted by child witnesses to be used as proof of guilt, was upheld.67 In
R. v. Levogiannis,68 section 486(2.1), permitting some complainants
under 18 to testify from behind screens or to use closed circuit telecast
facilities in sexual offence cases, survived a Charter attack. In R. v. Rose,69
section 651(3) of the Criminal Code,70 requiring those accused persons
who lead evidence to address the jury first in closing submissions, was
preserved. In R. v. Mills,71 a constitutional challenge to sections 278.1278.91, statutory provisions imposing limits on the disclosure of the
private records of complainants and witnesses in sexual offence cases,
was upheld in the face of full answer and defence claims. In R. v.
Darrach,72 a constitutional challenge to the successor provision to the
one struck down in Seaboyer,73 the “new” section 276, failed. In R. v. Pan,74
the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the jury secrecy rule in section 649
of the Criminal Code,75 and in R. v. Pires,76 a constitutional challenge to
the common law Garofoli77 test used to secure leave to cross-examine
search warrant affiants was dismissed.
In lower courts the results of challenges to trial procedures are no more
impressive. In R. v. Czuczman78 now section 475(1)(a), which permits
trials in absentia of absconding accused, failed. Section 548 permitting
64

[1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 68 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 68 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
67
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
68
[1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 25 C.R. (4th) 325 (S.C.C.).
69
[1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.).
70
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
71
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.).
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[2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 36 C.R. (5th) 233 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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[2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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[2005] S.C.J. No. 67, 33 C.R. (6th) 241 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Garofoli, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 (S.C.C.).
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[1986] O.J. No. 44, 49 C.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd using different reasoning in R. v.
Tzimopoulos, [1986] O.J. No. 817, 54 C.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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preliminary hearing judges to commit the accused to trial on offences
not charged where those offences arise out of the same transaction the
accused was charged with was also upheld in R. v. Cancor Software
Corp.79 Section 568, permitting the Crown to require jury trials for offences
carrying penalties of more than five years¸ received constitutional
endorsement.80 And the power to indict directly under section 577 has
survived.81
To a degree, even leaving aside those backfires where Charter
challenges have ultimately reduced liberty interests,82 this paltry record
of successful Charter litigation does lend some support to those early
Charter bashers who said, “We don’t need this.” Charter oversight
opponents were right in cautioning us that the very ideals that underlie
the Charter “have been with us as root principles of our common law for
many years”,83 diminishing the utility of the exercise. It is not surprising,
then, that most rules of trial process hold up well in the face of Charter
challenge. As Quigley observes, for example, “section 11(a) had added
nothing to the statutory and common law requirements for indictments and
informations.”84 As described above, sections 11(c) and 13 of the Charter,
its expressed self-incrimination provisions, largely track in their text the
protection that the law already recognized, and the constitutionalization
of the voluntariness rule has added nothing. In R. v. Cohn,85 Goodman J.,
whom Stuart credited with furnishing “the most general pronouncement
as to what is meant by procedural fairness”,86 described the accused as
having:
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence
with which he is charged, to have counsel, to have a reasonable time
to prepare a defence, to call witnesses and not be compelled to give
79
[1990] O.J. No. 1287, 79 C.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1991]
1 S.C.R. vii, 3 C.R. (4th) 194n (S.C.C.).
80
R. v. Hanneson, [1987] O.J. No. 8, 31 C.C.C.(3d) 560 (Ont. H.C.J.).
81
R. v. Moore, [1986] M.J. No. 56, 50 C.R. (3d) 243 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Arviv, [1985] O.J.
No. 2602, 45 C.R. (3d) 354 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.).
82
I explore this phenomenon, which I call “constitutional deflation” and the “rebound effect”
in “Charter Vertigo: Losing Constitutional Balance in Criminal Cases” in J.E. Magnet, ed., The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Perspectives at Twenty-Five Years [publication pending].
83
R. v. Gallant, [1982] O.J. No. 3481, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 213, at 222 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
84
Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997),
at 376.
85
[1984] O.J. No. 3344, 42 C.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
86
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell,
2001), at 177.
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evidence. [And] he has the right to be tried by an independent and
impartial tribunal.87

We had all of these things prior to the Charter. To be sure, it would
have been a condemnation of our past commitment to fundamental justice
had the Charter washed through the criminal trial process bowling laws
over in its wake. Still, to draw the conclusion that the missing clap of
section 52 declarations shows that the Charter has done little is incorrect,
even forgetting about the new trial process rules I describe above.
First, to rely on failed challenges to conclude that the Charter has
had little impact would be to fail to recognize the interpretative impact it
has had on the operation of law. Consider, for example, the interpretation
that has been given to the sexual offence provisions in sections 276 and
278.1-278.91. The constitutional challenge in Darrach88 to new section 276
“failed” for one reason alone; although the heart of the section was open
to two interpretations, one constitutional89 and the other unconstitutional,90
consistent with now basic canons of interpretation the provisions were
read so that they would reflect the minimum constitutional requirements
articulated in R. v. Seaboyer.91 It is unlikely they would have been
interpreted this cautiously in a non-Charter milieu.
Similarly, the constitutional challenge to sections 278.1-278.91 “failed”
in R. v. Mills92 only because the Supreme Court of Canada veritably
tortured some of its provisions into constitutionally compliant construction,
including, for example, by (1) reading a list of 11 “[i]nsufficient grounds”
of relevance93 as amounting to no more than a prohibition on making
bald assertions unsupported by evidence or context;94 (2) by interpreting
the requirement that a judge shall consider a list of factors in assessing
“the interests of justice”95 as a “do what you can in light of the information
you have available to you” provision;96 and (3) by regarding a section
87

R. v. Cohn, [1984] O.J. No. 3344, 42 C.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 36 C.R. (5th) 233 (S.C.C.).
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See “The New Rape Shield Provisions in Section 276 Should Survive Charter
Challenge” (1993) 21 C.R. (4th) 223, where I advanced this interpretation.
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See Ron Delisle, “Potential Charter Challenges to the New Rape Shield Law” (1992)
13 C.R. (4th) 390.
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R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 36 C.R. (5th) 233, at paras. 32-33 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.).
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See s. 278.3(4) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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See R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at paras. 118, 120 (S.C.C.).
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See s. 278.5(1), (2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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See R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 134 (S.C.C.).
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requiring that the accused “has established” the preconditions for
disclosure97 as an “err on the side of disclosure” provision.98
Although not a fair trial case, per se, United States v. Ferras 99
provides yet another example. The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted
the requirement that evidence must “justify committal” that is found in
section 29(1) of the Extradition Act100 as requiring judges in extradition
cases to ensure that the evidence presented is not so unreliable that it
would be dangerous or unsafe to convict upon,101 this notwithstanding a
long history of denying extradition judges the authority to consider the
credibility and reliability of proof.102 The Court arrived at this surprising
interpretation because of its conclusion that the Charter requires, at a
minimum, that there must be a meaningful judicial decision based on an
assessment of the evidence before one’s liberty is denied.103
The Charter’s impact on the interpretation and application of trial
procedures is not confined to cases where Charter challenges have been
brought. For example, the right of the accused to cross-examine has
been a right since long before the Charter but is now given more vitality
than it had at common law.104 Indeed, in R. v. Potvin,105 Wilson J. cautioned
courts that the “Charter casts doubt on the continued validity of preCharter decisions which did not construe the right to full opportunity to
cross-examine in the broad and generous manner befitting its constitutional
status”,106 and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the right to
cross-examine Crown witnesses “without significant and unwarranted
constraint” is an important part of the right to full answer and defence as
understood in a Charter milieu.107
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See s. 278.5(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
See R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 94 (re the balance),
paras. 120, 137 (re relevance) (S.C.C.). And see R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 165 C.C.C.
(3d) 225, at 264 (S.C.C.).
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102
United States of America v. Sheppard, [1976] S.C.J. No. 106, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1067 (S.C.C.).
103
United States v. Ferras, [2006] S.C.J. No. 33, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 353, at paras. 25-26 (S.C.C.).
104
R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at paras. 157-161 (S.C.C.).
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In R. v. Salituro,108 as the Hon. Marc Rosenberg points out,109 the
equality provisions of the Charter emboldened the Supreme Court of
Canada to revise the law of spousal evidence by holding that hopelessly
irreconcilable separation removes the bar on spousal competence.
In R. v. P. (M.B.),110 the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the
long-standing rule empowering judges to permit the Crown to reopen its
case. The guidelines that emerged are overtly Charter sensitive, with the
Court adverting not only to the constitutional demands of the principle
of a case to meet but also to concern about the indirect compulsion of
the accused.
Developments in the challenge for cause rules relating to jury
selection also have their genesis in the Charter right to a fair trial111 and,
without question, much of their inspiration in the race-based context
rests in equality rights influence.112
In short, the first reason why the poor section 52 performance cannot
be taken as a sign that there are few Charter tracks in matters of criminal
process is that even when the Charter does not produce declarations of
unconstitutionality, it changes things.
The key reason, however, why the feeble section 52 results do not
demonstrate the failing impact of the Charter is that the Charter has, in
critical ways, been able to work its magic, furtively, behind the scenes,
through the operation of three techniques that it has either inspired or
contributed to; the rise of a two-pronged “exclusionary discretion”, the
growth of what can perhaps be called the “inclusionary discretion” which
is manifest in those principled rules of admissibility that are inherently
flexible enough to operate in ways that respect the Charter; and the more
general “Charter adjustment power”. Together, these Charter-inspired
practices have changed the culture of legal rules. It is not wrong to say

1 S.C.R. 740 (S.C.C.), or the right to conduct prejudicial cross-examinations of vulnerable witnesses:
R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.).
108
[1991] S.C.J. No. 97, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
109
The Hon. Marc Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal
Cases” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
Carswell, 1996), at 198.
110
[1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 29 C.R. (4th) 209 (S.C.C.).
111
R. v. Sherratt, [1991] S.C.J. No. 21, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509, at 532 (S.C.C.).
112
See R. v. Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. C.A.), and R. v. Williams,
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
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that they have changed both lawyering during the trial process, as well
as the business of judging.113

IV. THE CHARTER-INSPIRED EXCLUSIONARY DISCRETION
1. The Long Road to Recognition
The story of the rise of the exclusionary discretion begins with the
decision in R. v. Corbett.114 As indicated, Corbett involved a failed Charter
challenge to section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act.115 This is the
provision that allows witnesses, including those who are accused, to be
cross-examined using their prior criminal convictions. Section 12 permits
this to be done solely for the purpose of showing that a witness’s testimony
should not be believed because of their discreditable character. Yet the
unquestionable reality is that there will be cases where the nature of
the convictions used during cross-examination will do far less to show
the accused’s dishonesty and far more to show his or her criminal
propensity, making it likely that juries will be improperly influenced.
In Corbett’s case, for example, the primary conviction at issue was for
manslaughter. Given the murder charge he faced, that conviction seemed
to tell the jury more about his capacity for violence than his honesty.
Corbett therefore argued that the section was unconstitutional contrary
to the fair trial guarantee in section 11(d) of the Charter. He urged that it
“unfairly prejudices an accused, in the sense that it presents the trier of
fact with evidence, not otherwise admissible, which the trier of fact will
inevitably take into account not only on the issue of credibility but also
[impermissibly] on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence”.116
Even though there would obviously be cases where the risk of
misuse of the evidence would be overwhelming, none of the judges
found the provision to be systemically unfair and so the constitutional
challenge failed. Four117 of the six agreed,118 however, that a trial judge
113

Indeed, the change has been so profound that in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact
on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), the Hon. Michael Moldaver penned a
scathing speech decrying what the Charter has done to the criminal trial process, in which he longed
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Judge’s Perspective”.
114
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has an exclusionary discretion to disallow the cross-examination of the
accused on his prior convictions in order to prevent prejudice from
undermining a fair trial, but only one judge, La Forest J., felt that the
provision operated unfairly in Corbett’s case. The thing that hurt Corbett’s
unfairness claim was that he had himself made generous use of the
criminal convictions of Crown witnesses to urge that their character
made them incredible. Given that, he could hardly maintain his protest
that it was unfair to permit the Crown to show that he, too, suffered
from the same discreditable character he was relying on to discredit
Crown witnesses. Even though Corbett’s conviction was affirmed and the
section survived, the recognition of an exclusionary discretion represented
a significant victory for due process.
Although history would prove it to be significant, the Charter “victory”
in Corbett119 was, without question, a cautious, even grudging one. It is
interesting that when Corbett was decided the practice of the Supreme
Court of Canada had been to strike down statutes in their entirety where
they could produce unconstitutional results in some cases, even though
they would operate appropriately in a majority of cases.120 I think it is
a fair read that the decision of the Court not to follow its then usual
practice and declare section 12 to be of no force or effect discloses its
reluctance to get into the business of using the Charter to recast rules of
criminal procedure and evidence. Without question, the recognition of
an exclusionary discretion was a strategy intended to preserve section 12
from Charter attack, even in the face of its difficulties.
Justice La Forest, in the key decision, acknowledged that it is “[t]he
recognition and proper exercise of this discretion [that] . . . ensures that
s. 12 is constitutionally valid”121 but, curiously, he scrupulously avoided
119

R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1, at 15 (S.C.C.).
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grounding that discretion in the Charter.122 At times, he seemed to rest
the discretion on the interpretation of the statute.123 At other times, he
focused on the common law, although ultimately the decision seems to
have turned on a common law inspired interpretation of the Act.124 In
any event, the reasoning in the case leaves the impression that the Court
was simply anxious to find a way to avoid tearing down an evidentiary
provision. The truth be told, there are in fact serious technical problems
with finding the discretion either in the statute or the common law, or
in a combination of the two. Prior to Corbett’s Charter challenge, the
received position was that section 12 could not be interpreted to admit
of an exclusionary discretion.125 While the provision does employ the
word “may”, it is obvious on reading section 12 that “may” is used to
describe the permission the section gives to the cross-examiner. There is
no natural construction that permits it to be read as signalling that the
procedure is dependent on the permission of the judge, a point that
McIntyre and Le Dain JJ. relied upon in dissenting from the claim that
section 12 permitted of any such discretion.126 As for the common law
source, McIntyre and Le Dain JJ. make the trenchant point that the common
law is subject to statutory provisions; it cannot control their field of
operation.127 Moreover, there were outstanding issues about the reach
of any common law exclusionary discretion, as common law courts,
uncomfortable with the idea, placed strict limits on any such power.
While Charter courts have, at times, cited the old Privy Council dicta in
Kuruma v. R.128 as supporting the notion that common law judges had
the “discretion to exclude evidence . . . ‘if the strict rules of admissibility
would operate unfairly against the accused’”.129 that was decidedly not
the pre-Charter practice in this country. We were the sons and daughters
of R. v. Wray,130 where the Supreme Court of Canada had defined that
authority in such limited fashion as to render it virtually useless. Suffice
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at 287 (S.C.C.).
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it to say that the common law did not provide a hospitable environment
for the discretion called upon in Corbett.131
Although it was largely left unsaid, there therefore seems to be little
question that the discretion in Corbett132 was fashioned creatively as a
way to avoid striking the provision down. The Hon. Justice Rosenberg
hailed resort to this kind of discretion as a way of relieving the most
blatant unfairness while avoiding “the unpalatable result of admitting
that all trials in Canada since time immemorial have been unfair”.133 The
exclusionary discretion in Corbett owes its recognition less to statutory
construction or true common law reasoning than it does to the constitutional
sword of Damocles that hung over the provision; had the discretion not
been recognized somehow, anyhow, the Court would have had no choice
but to strike it down, yet the Court was simply not ready yet to attribute
exclusionary discretion to the constitution, where it could become a
generally available tool. Corbett was a court trying to take baby steps,
but instead stumbling over the threshold of profound change.
In R. v. Potvin,134 the Court again divined a saving exclusionary
discretion from a controversial statutory interpretation.135 In doing so,
it was able to uphold section 715 of the Criminal Code,136 a hearsay
exception that ordinarily assists the Crown by allowing the admission of
testimony from a preliminary inquiry to be admitted during trial, provided
the witness is unavailable within the meaning of the statute and the
accused had a real opportunity to cross-examine. In spite of the Court
holding that the discretion was forged from the words of the provision,
the Potvin discretion was also unquestionably Charter-born. Only this time
the relationship was made modestly more overt. Justice Wilson relied on
Charter values exhibited in section 24(2) to affirm that the statutory
discretion had to be broad enough to support the rejection of evidence
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R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1, at 15 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1, at 15 (S.C.C.).
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The Hon. Marc Rosenberg “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal
Cases” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
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[1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 68 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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The discretion had been denied as a matter of statutory interpretation in R. v. Kaddoura,
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that was unfairly obtained.137 This was a major development, as previously,
with the exception of some secondary dictum in R. v. Clarkson,138 the
parsimonious exclusionary discretion that had been recognized in the
law of evidence operated only to protect the integrity of the trial from
evidence that would distort its outcome. In the end, the Court adopted
the exclusionary formula that is now ubiquitous in the law of evidence,
namely, the power of courts to exclude evidence where its prejudice
outweighs its probative value, and it endorsed a sweeping concept of
prejudice. Only this open and generous standard, the Court felt, could
enable the “‘two competing and frequently conflicting concerns’ of fair
treatment of the accused and society’s interest in the admission of
probative evidence in order to get at the truth of the matter in issue” to
be balanced.139
The following year, 1990, the decision in Thomson Newspapers Ltd.
v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research)140 was released. I
consider it to be a significant decision even though the Charter challenge
again failed. Its importance comes from the acknowledgment by La
Forest J. that sections 7,141 and 11(d)142 of the Charter give judges the
residual discretion to relax the rules of evidence to ensure that the accused
is given a fair trial, and that this is a generic exclusionary discretion that
can be used, even when not contemplated in statutory language.143 The
case involved a constitutional challenge to section 17 of the Combines
Investigation Act144 that required individuals to attend under order and
answer questions posed by the regulator. While that statute included a
“use immunity” protection in section 20(2) preventing any answers given
from being used in subsequent criminal proceedings, it did not provide
for the exclusion of evidence found as a result of those answers. Justice
La Forest reasoned that the principles of fundamental justice would require
137
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139
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S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 560 (S.C.C.).
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Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research), [1990]
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some immunity for this kind of derivative evidence, but resisted an
absolute rule. In order to save the statute he had to find a way to permit
exclusion of derivative evidence where it would operate unfairly. Since
there was no way to ground that exclusion in the statute, he had to link it
to the Charter, and, in the process, recognized a general exclusionary
authority. He combined the statututory discretion that was employed in
Corbett145 with the formula endorsed in Potvin146 and converted them
into a generic, non-statute dependent, constitutional tool by saying:
I see no reason why an approach like that in the now constitutonalized
rule adopted in the case of prejudicial evidence should not be extended
to derivative evidence which, like other prejudicial evidence within the
rule, can only be dealt with having due regard to the need to balance
the right of the accused and that of the public in a specific context. 147

While the decision of La Forest J. in Thomson Newspapers represented
an important recognition that the true locus of this kind of discretion in a
constitutional system has to be in the Charter, his comments were obiter
as the Charter challenge failed on other grounds. Three years later, in
R. v. L. (D.O.),148 this general constitutional tool was in fact put to overt use
by the Court to save section 715.1 of the Criminal Code,149 a provision
that permitted the adopted videotaped testimony of young sexual assault
complainants to be admitted as evidence during trial. The majority held
without pretence to construction or common law gloss, that:
the incorporation of judicial discretion into s. 715.1 which permits a
trial judge to edit or refuse to admit videotaped evidence where its
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, ensures that s. 715.1 is
consistent with fundamental principles of justice and the right to a fair
trial protected by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.150

The same day that L. (D.O.) was released, the Court issued its decision
in R. v. Levogiannis,151 upholding section 486(2.1) [now section 486.2(4),
as am. S.C. 2005, c. 2005, c. 32, s. 15] of the Criminal Code152 against
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147
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research), [1990]
S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 560-61 (S.C.C.).
148
[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
149
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
150
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285, at 291 (S.C.C.).
151
[1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 25 C.R. (4th) 325 (S.C.C.).
152
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
146

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER TRACKS

331

Charter attack. That section permits, among other things, children to give
their evidence from behind a screen in sexual offence cases. The accused
claimed that this procedure could prejudice him and compromise his
ability to cross-examine effectively. The Court did not dismiss the
possibility that use of a screen could work unfairly in this way. Instead,
it noted that the power to use the screen was discretionary and not
mandatory. Since the provision in issue in R. v. Levogiannis had been
crafted by Parliament to require a discretionary determination that can
be used to take account of Charter interests, there was no need to create
an exclusionary power to save the section. Its inherent flexibility would
be enough to protect Charter interests.

V. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY DISCRETION
1. The General Balance and the Requisite Priority on Liberty
Interests
In 1995, the authority to exclude technically admissible evidence to
preserve Charter interests was again affirmed in R. v. Harrer153 where
the Court featured the reach and flexibility of the balancing process.
Harrer had been apprehended by American immigration authorities. While
being questioned she implicated herself in a Canadian crime. Since the
Charter applies solely to the activities of Canadian state agents, the Court
held that she could not use Charter rights to impugn the way those
American authorities had questioned her. She argued, in the alternative,
that the Charter could be used to prevent the admission of that evidence
at her Canadian trial, and she invoked the exclusionary discretion claiming
that it would render her trial unfair for a Canadian court to rely on
statements she made in the United States in circumstances that would
not have respected her Charter rights, had those statements been secured
in the same fashion in Canada by Canadian state agents.154
The Court rejected the claim that admission would be unfair in her
case, but La Forest and McLachlin JJ. described the constitutional
authority to exclude in sweeping terms. Justice La Forest cautioned that
the “general principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial cannot be
153

[1995] S.C.J. No. 81, 42 C.R. (4th) 269 (S.C.C.).
Specifically, American authorities, while complying with American standards, had failed
to meet Charter standards by not readvising her of her right to counsel when the purpose of their
questioning changed from her immigration status to a different form of legal jeopardy, namely, her
complicity in the crime of assisting another to escape lawful custody in Canada.
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entirely reduced to specific rules”.155 Justice McLachlin gave the discretion
equal breadth but more detailed content. Fairness, she explained, is to be
determined contextually, bearing in mind not only the interests of the
accused, but also the interests of the community. It is a search for
balance.156 She then illustrated in a non-exhaustive way the wide range
of factors that could impel exclusion:
Evidence may render a trial unfair for a variety of reasons. The
way in which it was taken may render it unreliable. Its potential for
misleading the trier of fact may outweigh such minimal value it might
possess. Again, the police may have acted in such an abusive fashion that
the court concludes the admission of the evidence would irremediably
taint the fairness of the trial itself. 157

Quite clearly, when it comes to balancing the exclusion of evidence
tendered by the state against these broad-based kinds of consideration,
the state-based interest in admission will relate to its ability to demonstrate
the guilt of the accused. At times the Supreme Court of Canada has
articulated that interest with precision given the specific context of the
case. In R. v. L. (D.O.),158 for example, in describing the state interest in
relying on the adopted videotaped evidence of children who were having
difficulties presenting their versions through conventional testimony,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. spoke of state interest in adopting rules to “ensure
reliability” of the evidence presented, and to make child witness evidence
available.159 More often in balancing competing state-based inclusionary
considerations, judges tend to speak in broader terms, using phrases such
as the “Crown’s interest in obtaining the evidence”,160 “the principle . . .
that, in a search for truth, relevant evidence should be available to the
trier of fact”,161 and the state interest in “having the trial process arrive at
the truth”.162
These are, of course, vitally important state interests. The ultimate
point of the criminal trial is to arrive at the truth, subject to those
qualifications required to make it “just”, and it is obvious that the best
155
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way to arrive at the truth is by furnishing access to as much relevant
information as possible. When it comes to fair trial balancing, however,
there is an important consideration that must be respected: the state interests
and those of the accused are not in equal calibration. As the Supreme
Court of Canada has made clear, while the public interest is always to
be measured in achieving constitutional balance, in a criminal trial
the “primary emphasis [is] on the rights of the accused because . . .
of the requirement of a fair trial to avoid the wrongful conviction of
the innocent.”163 The highest principled value in balancing competing
considerations in the criminal process has to be the protection of the
innocent. Where Crown evidence is admissible under ordinary rules of
admission, though, the law will have already signalled that in ordinary
circumstances admission is appropriate. All of these considerations translate
well into the generic formula adopted by the majority in R. v. Potvin164
and that has now become truly familiar. The Charter gives trial judges the
power to exclude otherwise admissible Crown evidence where its probative
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effects, whatever they might be,
always bearing in mind the importance of particularly protecting the
innocent.
2. The Special Case of Unreliability
In spite of the generality of the constitutional discretion, care has to
be used in grounding pro-exclusionary prejudice in concerns about the
inherent reliability of evidence. It has to be remembered that evidence is
submitted to two kinds of assessment, admissibility and deliberation.
There have been long-standing efforts made in Canadian law to prevent
judges from usurping the role of the trier of fact, whose ultimate function
it is to assess reliability. The fact that judges or juries will assess the
reliability of admitted evidence before using it does diminish the force
of requests for reliability-based discretionary exclusion.
The case of R. v. Buric,165 however, appears to take that caution too
far. There the police tainted the evidence of their key witness by showing
him witness statements and other fruits of their investigation before
securing his version. The trial judge was of the view that this witness,
163
R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 165 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 264 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 89 (S.C.C.).
164
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 68 C.R. (3d) 193, at 237 (S.C.C.).
165
[1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at 748 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
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already unsavoury, and who had swung a deal with the police in exchange
for his testimony, appeared to have tailored his proof to meet the
evidence he had been shown. The trial judge stopped short of finding an
abuse of process, but held that the admission of such unreliable evidence
would render the trial unfair. That exclusionary decision was overturned.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a decision upheld by endorsement in the
Supreme Court of Canada, ruled without apparent qualification that:
“[t]he admission of evidence which may be unreliable does not per se
render a trial unfair. It is for the jury to assess the quality of the
evidence.”166
That proposition is questionable, stated, as it is, in such apparently
absolute terms. Recall that in R. v. Harrer167 McLachlin J. said that the
“way in which [evidence is] taken may render it unreliable”,168 thereby
supporting fair trial exclusion, which was exactly the complaint made in
Buric.169
In spite of this, the Buric170 holding has influenced the way that
courts have exercised their exclusionary discretion where the essential
prejudice concern rests with unreliability. In R. v. Campbell,171 for
example, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that “it was not open to him
to conduct a voir dire on the question of admissibility” of the evidence
of a jail house informant based on reliability concerns, as reliability was
for the trier of fact to determine.172 Similarly, courts tend not to use their
discretion to exclude voluntary confessions,173 or confessions not made
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to persons in authority,174 because of potential unreliability. The appropriate
legal mechanism, they hold, is for judges to warn juries about the
frailties that raise those reliability concerns, and let the juries decide.175
While courts should always factor in the reality that a trier of fact
will consider reliability of all admitted evidence, it is difficult to treat
any of this as a legitimate absolute prohibition on using the discretion to
exclude unreliable Crown proof. After all, in both R. v. Potvin176 and
R. v. L. (D.O.),177 the pro-exclusionary concerns that were balanced by
the Court related to the fear that the hearsay evidence being admitted
would be unreliable without cross-examination. And Courts have, for
example, reserved the right to exclude “in dock” identifications where
their prejudice outweighs their probative value, and the “prejudice” in
such cases has a fast link to reliability.178 Moreover, as will be described
below, threshold “unreliability” is a key consideration in excluding
hearsay, expert opinion evidence, and even similar fact evidence.179
It is difficult to reconcile these practices with the apparently
unequivocal reasoning in Buric.180 Justice Weiler attempted in her
concurring decision to distinguish the exclusionary discretion from the
operation of exclusionary rules by noting that where the latter rules
apply, evidence is presumptively inadmissible, but where the discretion
is invited, the evidence is presumptively admissible.181 This is certainly
true but these fixed rules and the exclusionary discretion share the goal
of increasing the accuracy of judicial outcomes. It is difficult to see why
the prejudgment about reliability that is inherent in general rules of
174
In R. v. Wells, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1233, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 504 (B.C.C.A.), the Court relied
on the Charter-based discretion to support the exclusion of a coerced confession made to the father
of a sexual assault victim, but at the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court made a fast link to
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whether the statement was voluntary: R. v. Wells, [1998] S.C.J. No. 67, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 517 (S.C.C.).
175
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178
See R. v. Vivar, [2003] O.J. No. 5100 (Ont. S.C.J.), where Dambrot J. examines R. v.
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(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Tat, [1997] O.J. No. 3579, 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 498 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v.
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exclusion should forge a legitimate basis for reliability-based inadmissibility,
but the unreliability that may be manifest on a case-by-case assessment
should not. It is certainly not in keeping with the preference expressed by
courts in recent years for contextual decision-making to reason this way.
Of more concern is that courts consider unreliability to be an important
pro-exclusionary factor at the behest of the Crown when exercising
discretion whether to admit evidence of the prior sexual experiences of
complainants.182 As a simple matter of principle, it is inappropriate to
exclude defence evidence on a case-by-case basis because it appears to
be unreliable, but to leave dangerous Crown evidence to the trier of fact
to reject. Moreover, in R. v. L. (D.O.),183 the state-based interest relied
upon to defeat the Charter challenge to section 715.1 was the interest in
securing reliable evidence. Why should access to reliable evidence be an
inclusionary consideration in Charter balancing, but unreliability not be
an exclusionary one?
Perhaps the explanation for the uneven state of authority is the simple
observation furnished in Germany (Federal Republic) v. Schreiber,184 by
Watt J., who observed that “there is no single organizing or justificatory
principle that underlies every rule” and “no general requirement of
reliability applicable to each item of evidence tendered for admission”.185
As a description of the state of law, this is no doubt true and it is perhaps
not surprising given that the law of evidence grew in the common law
fashion on a case-by-case basis, at times losing the thread of consistent
principle. Yet the failing of rules of proof provides the very justification
for the development of the constitutional exclusionary discretion, not
a reason to deny it. It is unprincipled to make reliability taboo as an
exclusionary consideration in some cases, yet to treat it as an appropriate
reason for having exclusionary rules in others. Judges should be trusted
to show restraint in excluding evidence under their discretion based on
unreliability concerns, but should not be disentitled from protecting the
fair trial interests of the accused from unreliable evidence in appropriate
cases.
182

See R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, at para. 63 (S.C.C.), and
R. v. McIntyre, [1993] O.J. No. 2971 (Ont. C.A.).
183
[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
184
[2002] O.J. No. 5845, 170 C.C.C. (3d) 184 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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Germany (Federal Republic) v. Schreiber, [2002] O.J. No. 5845, 170 C.C.C. (3d) 184,
at paras. 44-46 (Ont. S.C.J.). This decision involved an interim ruling in the context of an extradition
application. Extradition was subsequently ordered in the main application [2004] O.J. No. 2310
(Ont. S.C.J.) and upheld on appeal: Germany (Federal Republic) v. Schreiber, [2006] O.J. No. 789,
206 C.C.C. (3d) 339 (Ont. C.A.).
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What, then, would be an appropriate case? In my view, it would be
where it is not possible for the trier of fact to assess apparently unreliable
evidence. While it is fair enough to rely on triers of fact to discard
unreliable evidence, where they are not in a position to come to a rational
decision to rely upon it because they do not have adequate data for
evaluation or because the evidence is attended by other forms of prejudice,
judges should be permitted to prevent such dangerous proof from becoming
part of the trial record. When I first analyzed the principles of proof to
identify what I consider to be an appropriate standard, I concluded that
the law of evidence tends to exclude unreliable evidence where there
will be difficulties inhibiting the ability to assess it properly, and urged
that the exclusionary Charter principle should operate the same way.186
This was the focus of Laskin J.A.’s dissent in R. v. Buric.187 The trial
judge had concluded that the evidence of the police informant could not
be properly assessed because the police had not kept adequate records of
the way his version of events was secured and any meaningful crossexamination would require that the defence trot out the very suggestive
and prejudicial information the police had relied upon to secure the
informant’s suspect version; this coupled with its inherent unreliability
supported exclusion of the witness’s testimony.188 The majority in Buric
disagreed. In the end, though, that decision should not be taken as
expressing disagreement with the proposition I am advancing here. After
all, the majority concluded that in Buric the judge had gotten it wrong
and the evidence could in fact be evaluated fairly and meaningfully on
the record available.189
Of interest, when the case went back to retrial after the failed Supreme
Court of Canada appeal, the Crown withdrew the charges. It apparently
considered that its evidence was too unreliable to secure a conviction.
In sum, there is an issue about the propriety of using unreliability as
a form of pro-exclusionary prejudice that can be relied upon by the accused.
Principle and consistency suggests that it should be a fit consideration,
albeit one to be used in a guarded manner and in conjunction with other
186

Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 359.
[1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997]
1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
188
R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at paras. 54, 69 (Ont. C.A.), per
Laskin J.A., dissenting, affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
189
R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 25 (Ont. C.A.), per
Labrosse J.A., and paras. 48-50 (Weiler J.A., concurring), affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R.
535 (S.C.C.).
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considerations. In all events, Buric190 should not be read as preventing
judges from using their constitutional discretion in cases where the
evidence is not only apparently unreliable, but it is so under circumstances
where its reliability cannot safely be assessed or where unreliability is
combined with other forms of prejudice.
3. Summary: The Exclusionary Discretion
Together the series of decisions beginning with Corbett191 and ending
with Harrer192 mark a cultural shift in the law. Admissibility of Crown
evidence is not simply a matter of applying rules of proof, as it once
was. It is a matter of judgment, certainly directed by rules of proof but
ultimately informed by the nature of the impact admission could have
on the fairness of the trial, bearing in mind state interests to be sure, but
with intent focus on the liberty interests that the Charter was meant
to protect — those of the accused. Considerations as diverse as the
inflammatory nature of the proof, its potential to mislead, the confusion
it will cause, the respect it reflects for self-conscription considerations,
the fairness of the way the state acted while acquiring that proof and,
yes, its reliability are all features that can and do override the technical
law of proof. That is, by any measure, a profound change. And it has not
gone ignored. Harrer, which has curiously come to be treated as the font
of the exclusionary discretion has been cited, as of the time of this
writing, in 290 electronically reported cases. Without question, the way
the law of proof operates in criminal cases has undergone a quiet
revolution because of the Charter. And that is not all. There is a flip side
to that Charter coin, the “inclusionary discretion”.

VI. THE CHARTER-AIDED INCLUSIONARY DISCRETION
The incremental march of the authorities to the recognition of a
Charter-based exclusionary discretion revealed a truism about fact-finding
and fairness: that rules of proof “should [not] be interpreted in a
restrictive manner which may essentially defeat their purpose of seeking

190
R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
191
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1, at 15 (S.C.C.).
192
R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, 42 C.R. (4th) 269 (S.C.C.).
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truth and justice”.193 Just as Charter rights may have value in different
contexts194 so too can the interests sought to be secured by the rules of
evidence. As the Corbett195 line of authority shows, there are times when
truth and justice can be advanced best by excluding proof. More often,
though, truth and justice can be secured by admitting proof, a reality
demonstrated dramatically by the Charter decision of R. v. Seaboyer196
in which a rigid rule that would have prevented the admission of what
would be in some cases, important defence evidence, was struck down.
Charter jurisprudence in the late 1980s was at the vanguard in showing
that rigid rules of proof are to be avoided in the interests of justice.
Yet the Charter did not march alone in the quest to loosen rules of
proof. It had an unlikely partner in the law and order objective of securing
better protection of sexual assault victims, particularly children, a march
the Charter rule-loosening jurisprudence may well have inspired. In
R. v. L. (D.O.),197 while giving stalwart defence to the need to avoid classic
exclusionary rules that would otherwise prevent videotaped evidence from
being admitted, L’Heureux-Dubé J. remarked:
The modern trend in this field has been to admit all relevant and
probative evidence and allow the trier of fact to decide the weight to
be given to that evidence in order to arrive at a result that will be just.
A just result is best achieved when the decision-makers have all
relevant and probative information before them. . . . Consequently,
adherence to . . . strict rules . . . may result in valuable information not
being brought to the court’s attention. Moreover, the Court has recently
sought to further remove obstacles to the truth seeking process, in a
genuine attempt to return to the basic goal of truth-finding. . . . Rules of
evidence . . . are not cast in stone and will evolve with time. 198

A case she cited in support? It was the Charter decision in R. v.
Seaboyer.199 If the Charter gave birth to the exclusionary discretion and
the contextual balancing of competing state and due process interests,
it no doubt played a significant role in the development of the principled
193

R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285, at 309 (S.C.C.), per L’HeureuxDubé J. concurring.
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R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285, at para. 27 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, 64 C.R. (3d) 1, at 15 (S.C.C.).
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[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285 (S.C.C.).
198
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, 25 C.R. (4th) 285, at 310-11 (S.C.C.), per L’HeureuxDubé J. concurring.
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[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
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approach to proof that now characterizes the law of evidence. Its link
between flexibility and justice was contributing to the legal culture
surrounding proof.
The principle approach is now intimately familiar to criminal lawyers.
It has been with us in increasing measure since R. v. Khan,200 where the
admission of hearsay was invited if it met the necessity and threshold
reliability requirements. Gradually, the movement expanded, first engaging
privilege,201 and then opinion evidence,202 and then voluntariness,203 and
then bad character evidence,204 Ultimately, the principled approach took
on quasi-constitutional dimension when the Supreme Court of Canada
decided in R. v. Starr205 to measure the integrity and application of fixed
exceptions to hearsay using the principles of necessity and reliability. In
Buric,206 Weiler J.A. observed:
It is when a judge is dealing with evidence which is generally not
admissible but which may exceptionally be admitted that the exercise
of the trial judge’s discretion is most likely to be invoked. 207

She is right. The principled approach amounts, in substance, to an
“inclusionary discretion”.
The thing about discretion, of course, is that it best enables Charter
values to be secured. It is therefore where there is discretion to admit
that Charter challenges are therefore most likely to fail, because discretion
can be exercised in a way that respects those values. This is why the
Charter challenge failed in R. v. Darrach208 dealing with the admission
of the past sexual history of complainants. As interpreted, that provision
empowered judges to make a contextual assessment of admissibility,
bearing in mind the constitutional interests of the accused. It is also why
the Charter challenge to the Garofoli209 test failed in R. v. Pires.210 That
200

[1990] S.C.J. No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Gruenke (sub nom. R. v. Fosty), [1991] S.C.J. No. 80, 8 C.R. (4th) 368 (S.C.C.).
202
R. v. Mohan, [1994] S.C.J. No. 36, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Handy, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 (S.C.C.).
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[2000] S.C.J. No. 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 33 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1997]
S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.).
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[2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 36 C.R. (5th) 233 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Garofoli, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 (S.C.C.).
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[2005] S.C.J. No. 67, 33 C.R. (6th) 241 (S.C.C.).
201

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER TRACKS

341

procedure provided the court with discretion to permit cross-examination
where it was truly needed to vindicate section 8 constitutional rights.
Not surprisingly, the Charter’s role has gone beyond helping to open
the law of evidence to discretion. It has also contributed to the shape
those rules take. In R. v. B. (K.G.),211 the principles were designed to take
account of the demands of the Charter.212 And although the exceptions
are narrowly circumscribed, privileges tend to come post-Charter with
“innocence exceptions” as is the case with police informant privilege, 213
and solicitor-client privilege.214
More importantly, it has come to be broadly accepted since the
Charter that where the defence is seeking to admit exculpatory evidence,
those principled rules should be applied less rigidly than they would
where the Crown seeks admissibility. Acceptance of this basic principle
grew in the early days of the Charter. In R. v. Lucier,215 the Supreme
Court of Canada restricted access to a fixed exception to the hearsay
rule to accused persons, given the importance of their liberty interests;
the Crown is unable to use this declaration against penal interest exception
but the accused can. Then, in R. v. Williams, Martin J. softened the blow
of his observation that the accused persons must comply with the ordinary
rules of proof in making full answer and defence,216 by observing that
judges have the discretion to relax the rules of exclusion in certain cases
to ensure that an accused is given a fair trial and can make full answer
and defence.217 It was in the Charter case of R. v. Seaboyer,218 however,
where the firmest foundation for this principle evolved:
Canadian courts, like courts in most common law jurisdictions, have
been extremely cautious in restricting the power of the accused to call
evidence in his or her defence, a reluctance founded in the fundamental
211

[1993] S.C.J. No. 22, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (S.C.C.).
[1993] S.C.J. No. 22, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (S.C.C.). See the Hon. Marc Rosenberg, “The
Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s
Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 198-99.
213
R. v. Liepert, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 24 (S.C.C.).
214
R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brown, [2002]
S.C.J. No. 35, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
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[1982] S.C.J. No. 109, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 28 (S.C.C.).
216
R. v. Williams, [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 50 O.R. (2d) 321, at 337 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. xiv, 50 O.R. (2d) 321n (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Williams. [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 50 O.R. (2d) 321, at 343 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. xiv, 50 O.R. (2d) 321n (S.C.C.), and see R. v. Rowbotham, [1988]
O.J. No. 271, 63 C.R. (3d) 113, at 164 (Ont. C.A.), and R. v. Cruikshanks, [1990] B.C.J. No. 1562,
58 C.C.C. (3d) 26 (B.C.C.A.).
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[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.).
212

342

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

tenet of our judicial system that an innocent person must not be
convicted.219

As a result, it was recognized subsequently in R. v. Finta220 that
hearsay evidence that the Crown would not be permitted to call would
be available to the defence, because the exclusionary discretion attached
to the rule would operate differently. In R. v. Folland,221 the accused
won a retrial on other grounds, but Rosenberg J.A. alerted the new trial
judge to bear in mind when considering Folland’s request to admit the
prior inconsistent statements of his friend as proof of their truth, that:
while the trial judge must be satisfied that the prior out-of-court utterances
have some reliability, the strict standards set, in the context of an
application by the Crown to make substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements incriminating the accused . . . do not apply. 222

Similarly, courts are more generous in applying the Mohan223 standards
for the admission of opinion evidence when they are considering defence
evidence. With respect to the “relevance” analysis, the Ontario Court of
Appeal noted in R. v. M. (B.)224 that “a trial judge should be particularly
cautious in excluding expert defence evidence on the basis of a cost-benefit
analysis.”225 Dealing with the “necessity” requirement, the Northwest
Territories Court of Appeal said in R. v. Bell:226
Where, as here, expert evidence is offered by the defence, in its efforts
to make full answer and defence, a trial judge should not impose as noted
in Mohan, too strict a standard for the necessity of such evidence.227

And when it comes to matters of privilege and privacy, the liberty of
the accused are given paramount interest. In third party records cases,
although there is extensive protection afforded to privacy interests, the
discretion provided for by those regimes in a criminal trial is to be
undertaken with the “primary emphasis on the rights of the accused

219
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because . . . of the requirement of a fair trial to avoid the wrongful
conviction of the innocent”.228
The same holds true with discretionary exclusion of defence evidence.
The standards are more halting than when applied against the Crown,
since prejudice must substantially outweigh probative value to warrant
exclusion of defence evidence, where simply imbalance of probative
value and prejudice will support a discretion to exclude Crown evidence.229
And it has long been understood, but again, has taken on Charter urgency,
that cross-examination by the accused is to be given special latitude so
that full answer and defence and the demonstration of innocence are not
frustrated.230
This is not, of course, to say that the accused has carte blanche to
avoid rules of exclusion. They prima facie apply, and when a court is
balancing competing considerations, it is to take into account state interests
including the principle that “the exclusion of relevant evidence can be
justified on the ground that the potential prejudice to the trial process
of admitting the evidence clearly outweighs its value”,231 and “the
complainant’s and witness’s right to privacy”232 as well as “the encouraging
of reporting and the protection of the security . . . of witnesses”.233 Other
factors include controlling the “prolixity of proceedings” and the “need
to protect informants”.234 This list is not exhaustive. These and other
state-based interests are to be weighed against the principle that a trier
of fact should have access to relevant evidence, coupled with the lower
standards applicable to the admissibility of defence evidence, and the
need to ensure access to evidence so as to be able to access the remedial
scheme of the Charter.235
In sum, the Charter, along with an unlikely law and order partner
agitating in favour of truth about guilt in sexual offence cases, contributed
to the breakdown in pigeonhole admissibility determinations. The Charter
has done no less than to help usher in an era of principled rules of
admissibility. It has helped change the way we think about admission,
228
R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 165 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 264 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 89 (S.C.C.).
229
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117, at 139 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.).
231
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 606 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 17 (S.C.C.).
233
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 611-12 (S.C.C.).
234
R. v. Pires, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, 33 C.R. (6th) 241, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Pires, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, 33 C.R. (6th) 241, at para. 24 (S.C.C.).
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and it has altered how those rules operate; when that principled era arrived,
the Charter’s value and authority resulted in guidelines from appellate
courts which ensure that the application of the law is sensitive to the full
answer and defence concerns of the accused.

VII. THE GENERAL POWER TO ACHIEVE CHARTER COMPLIANCE
I have focused in discussing the “exclusionary discretion” and the
“inclusionary discretion” on the laws of evidence, to the exlusion of
other trial procedures. In fact, it is not only rules of admissibility that
have been affected. The truth is that the Charter has ushered in an era of
discretion that can be used in the application of any trial procedures to
ensure Charter compliance. The “exclusionary discretion” brought on by
the Charter includes the discretion to exclude the operation of other
rules of process, and the inclusionary discretion encompasses the power
to include rights not found in settled law where it is required to do so to
ensure fairness.
When the Levogiannis236 challenge was being taken to the use of
screens to shield sexual offence complainants, the Court was challenged
with unique procedural problems that could occur where the accused is
self-represented and might therefore be prevented from observing the
witness while cross-examining. The Court responded in a passage of
critical importance to understanding the Charter’s impact on the criminal
process:
the trial judge has discretion to adopt whatever procedure or device is
best suited to prevent the infringement of an accused’s rights and to
ensure a fair trial.237

And with that, the need to strike down rules of criminal procedures was
removed; keep the rules, but leave them open to whatever tinkering the
demands of fundamental justice or a fair trial may require.

236
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R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 25 C.R. (4th) 325 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, 25 C.R. (4th) 325, at para. 35 (S.C.C.).
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In R. v. Rose,238 the attempt by the accused to strike down section 651
of the Criminal Code,239 which dictates that the accused must address the
jury first, was upheld in the face of a Charter challenge that this violates
his right to full answer and defence. Again, the majority of the Court put
faith in the inherent jurisdiction of the court, enshrined in section 11(d)
of the Charter, to take remedial action, including by permitting the accused
to reply to an improper Crown address, to assist in upholding the provision.
It is noteworthy that when saving the evidentiary provision in
section 715.1 from Charter challenge in R. v. L. (D.O.),240 L’HeureuxDubé J. relied on Baron v. Canada,241 a decision in which a Charter
challenge to a search warrant provision was avoided by reading discretion
into the issuance process. She said that it supported the application of an
exclusionary discretion in section 715.1 applications because in “Baron
v. Canada . . . this Court held that residual judicial discretion may be
constitutionally required in order to provide a mechanism for balancing
the rights of the accused and those of the state”.242
Where the initial discretion in matters of criminal procedure is not
vested in the court but instead in the Crown, the same basic approach
prevails. Given that prosecutors can use that discretion in a manner that
will vindicate constitutional rights, there is no need to declare the provisions
conferring that discretion to be unconstitutional. Abuse of process authority
or other Charter relief appropriate to the case at hand is relied upon to
control abusive decisions or misuse of those procedural rules that are
flexible enough to permit their use consistently with the requirements of
the Charter.243
238
R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, 129 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 130-37 (S.C.C.). To be
precise, four of nine judges recognized this authority. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, who agreed with
those four that the provision is not unconstitutional, would have held that the discretion to rectify
this unfairness had been removed by Parliament in the language of the section. It has to be wondered
how Parliament can remove a discretion enshrined in the Charter and ex hypothesi¸ necessary to full
answer and defence. Four dissenting justices would have struck the provision down in its entirety.
239
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
240
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In short, the Charter gives the courts the flexibility to insert and use
the discretion needed to ensure that criminal processes other than the
rules of proof are used in a Charter compliant way.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Rules of criminal procedure, if read literally, will at times be too
tight to ensure access to probative defence evidence or too loose to prevent
unreliable evidence of guilt. And they will be too rigid to prevent unfair
consequences. Ironically, their underlying purpose will be defeated by
their own authority. Many of our pre-Charter rules read as if they should
produce such results. They therefore seemed ripe for section 52 Charter
challenge. Many jurists were apprehensive in the early days of the Charter,
not only about the disruptive effect this would have but the message it
might send about pre-Charter justice. They therefore resisted. Charter
jurisprudence succumbed to this pressure, and failed to produce the
expected thunder of striking down over- or under-inclusive rules of
proof and criminal procedure. It is therefore true that the Charter has not
overhauled the laws of evidence and trial process.
Still, it would be a mistake to treat these unsuccessful section 52
challenges as the bleached bones of Charter failure. The truth is that
most of these provisions did not survive Charter challenge because they
were Charter sensitive, or because the Charter was too infirm to fix them.
In almost every case, the rules survived because the Charter was used
creatively and discretely to forge enough flexibility into the criminal
process to control outcomes on a contextual, case-by-case basis. While,
with the exception of the new principled rules of exclusion, the laws of
evidence and trial process remain much the same after a quarter-century,
but the law of evidence and trial process has been profoundly altered
and it has happened precisely because of the Charter. The Charter has
liberated rules from their technical shackles and changed the way they
are applied. It has dredged underlying principles from beneath wooden
language so that those principles would become the guideposts for
procedural decisions. As a result, rules are no longer checklist procedures
Crown discretion to consent to a non-jury trial under s. 473 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 or
to Charter-based interference; see R. v. Scott, [1990] S.C.J. No. 132, 2 C.R. (4th) 153 (S.C.C.), for
recognition of the use of abuse of process to control improper exercise of the Crown discretion to
stay proceedings, and R. v. Arviv, [1985] O.J. No. 2602, 45 C.R. (3d) 354 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [1985] 1 S.C.R. v (note) (S.C.C.), recognizing the authority of a court to interfere with a direct
indictment when it undermines the ability to make full answer and defence.
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that apply when each of their elements are met. And legal debate in
matters of criminal procedure is no longer about the application of
technical rules. It is about whether discretion should be exercised to
modulate those rules in the interests of fair hearings and full answer and
defence. If the rules have not all been changed in their terms, their
authority has been.
Simply put, discretion to protect Charter interests has worked its
way into the fabric of the trial process at every stage. When things are
understood in this way it is apparent that the Charter’s impact has not
been modest. It has been profound. Even leaving aside the dramatic
“new” rules the Charter has engendered, Charter tracks are all over the
trial process.

